We 
Introduction
There are two main applications for speaker recognition technology. The most frequently considered is the verification of cooperative speakers on a per-trial basis. The other is for surveillance of a large set of speech samples to try to locate a given speaker of interest. The obvious application is to law enforcement and intelligence activities but areas such as news indexing are also relevant [1] . The analysis presented here is applicable to other similar areas of probabilistic pattern recognition.
Some researchers have concentrated on the open-set identification task, where the question asked of the system is, "which, if any, of the sample speakers is the target speaker?". While this is indeed the question in general to be addressed by surveillance systems, the performance metric universally used is the raw recognition rate. We believe that for some applications a surveillance system that consistently almost recognizes the target speaker can be just as useful as one which is consistently correct and present here performance measures to demonstrate this. We were unable to locate previous work discussing this aspect of the use of speaker recognition systems for surveillance.
The need for caution
It is widely recognized that caution is required when advocating the use of speaker recognition systems in forensic contexts [4] . This is because: the ramifications of the experiment outcome are potentially severe; it is easy for non-experts to place too much reliance on an experiment outcome without understanding the true significance of the result; the speaker recognition experiment is merely part of a larger decision-making process and the technology must be set up in such a way as to not usurp parts of that process which do not properly belong to it; and the effects of such factors as intentional voice disguise, time lapse, illness and uncontrolled recording conditions are poorly understood at best.
These words of warning apply also to the use of automatic recognition technologies in surveillance systems. In addition, the probable secrecy (with respect to the subjects) of the surveillance operation denies them the opportunity to rebut or refute any claim of identity by the system. This applies to an even greater extent to systems used in the manner outlined in this paper, where substantial numbers of errors are to be expected relative to the number of successful detections, thus necessitating the intervention and cooperation of human experts. It is the responsibility of system developers to educate users and potential users of surveillance systems regarding the dangers of naive use of such systems and to emphasize that surveillance systems should not be used as primary evidence of identity in subsequent actions, legal or otherwise. Nevertheless, surveillance systems are an invaluable tool for directing the attention of suitably trained experts towards subjects who are more likely to be of attention to them, and it is in this context that this paper is written.
Verification mode
Speaker recognition researchers and users are familiar with the verification mode of system use. This is based on a series of individual trials, each of which results in a decision to accept or reject the claimed identity. Using this mode of operation for surveillance means treating each sample as a claim to identity of the target speaker and deciding whether or not to accept the claim based on whether or not the score produced by the system exceeds some pre-set threshold. This threshold may be dependent on the target speaker, and may even vary randomly from trial to trial [3] , but the important fact is that a hard accept/reject decision is made.
Verification behaviour
Verification behaviour is well-captured by the standard Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curve [5] which shows the relationship between the probability of a miss p(m) and the probability of a false alarm p(f ). The DET curve is in essence a ROC curve displayed on axes scaled by normal deviates rather than linearly. An intuitively comfortable statistic of interest for a surveillance system is false alarms per hit, and the associated rate of misses for a given operating point. If N f false trials must be attempted for every true trial, we find that the number of false alarms is N f p(f ) while the number of successful hits is 1 − p(m). This gives the system a performance of 
Verification example
In [9] there appears an argument that large scale surveillance systems are impractical, as the number of false alarms will inevitably swamp the number of hits, even assuming unreasonably small error probabilities. The example given is as follows. A surveillance system is required to search 10 12 samples looking for 10 target samples. For simplicity, we reduce this to a system searching 10 11 samples looking for 1 target sample, though the two tasks are not equivalent, as we will discuss later. The system has a false negative rate p(m) = 0.001 and a false positive rate of p(f ) = 0.01. The author of [9] does the arithmetic described above and concludes, 'This unrealistically-accurate system will generate one billion false alarms for every real terrorist plot it uncovers. ' We argue that this reasoning is valid if the system is operating in verification mode, where a hard yes/no decision is made for each sample. However, in some surveillance applications, the performance can be improved significantly.
Prioritization mode
Surveillance systems need not make hard decisions, and in view of the points of expressed in Section 2, it may be unwise to do so. A more appropriate use may be as a tool to prioritize samples for further examination by experts.
It is assumed that the surveillance system is operating on a large set of samples, with the task of interest being to locate the single speaker of interest. While this may seem an unrealistic constraint, it models somewhat accurately a type of surveillance application where the primary goal is to search for a single target, regardless of the number of actual targets present. This may be, for example, because once a single target is located, associated collateral information allows the easy (or easier) detection of all remaining targets.
The system presents its finding in the form of a queue -an ordered list of samples in descending order of likelihood of being the speaker of interest. We further assume that the user of the system has no further information on the likelihood of the speaker of interest being in any given sample, but is able, on inspecting the samples, to make a determination as to whether the true speaker is present or not. Thus, the user's rational approach is to inspect each sample in order from the top of the queue down. The surveillance system will be most useful when the target appears as close as possible to the top of the queue. It is clear that assessing prioritization performance by examining verification performance is equivalent to assuming that all target samples scores greater than the threshold are strictly less than all false samples that also exceed the threshold, which is clearly not the case.
However, in reality there may be multiple target samples present, and the system as described will detect the target who is positioned highest in the queue. This will tend to improve overall performance under the constraints assumed, so we have concentrated on analysing the average performance as a worst-case scenario.
Modelling queueing performance
We assume the the recognition system is some type of system which produces a real-valued score, indicating the likelihood that the sample under examination is a match to the target. Current state-of-the-art speaker recognition technologies use Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) which exhibit this type of behaviour. It is assumed that true speaker scores are distributed as univariate Gaussian variables, as are false speaker scores. False speaker scores are assumed to have been normalized to a standard normal distribution, that is with mean µ f = 0 and standard deviation σ f = 1. True speaker scores are also normally distributed, with mean µ t and standard deviation σ t . While it is known that neither true speaker scores or false speaker score are actually normally distributed [6] , most researchers assume that they are. This not only provides a benefit in simplicity, it has also been used to develop several effective score normalisation techniques such those in [8, 2] .
We assume that there is a set of N f false speaker samples and one true speaker sample, making the total sample size N = N f + 1.
We are interested in the proportion of false speakers who are expected to score higher than the true speaker. If the false speaker's score was t, then the proportion of false speakers who scored higher than t is equal to the probability that a single speaker scores higher than t. We assume that µ f = 0 and σ f = 1, which gives
where
Since ρ = u(t) is a one-to-one function, there exists an inverse function t = w(ρ), and it is easy to find that
where y = erf −1 (x) is the inverse function of y = erf(x).
If the distribution function of t is f (t), and ρ = u(t), ρ has the distribution function
where J = dt dρ and is called the Jacobian of w. J be found by noting that
which gives us, after differentiating using the chain rule,
Thus, since t has the distribution this leads to the following expression for g(ρ), 
Performance measures

Mean target speaker position
The mean target speaker position is given bȳ
where g(ρ) is given by equation 9.ρ gives the expected proportion of the false speakers who will score higher than the target speaker. This statistic is useful for such purposes as forecasting the average resource utilization per target speaker detection. Figure 1 shows a plot of mean target speaker position for a range of different values of µ t and σ t .
Median target speaker position
In general, as µ t increases and σ t decreases, g(ρ) becomes increasingly skewed. This means that usually the target speaker is very close to the top of the queue, but occasionally appears far down the list. In these situations it is unlikely that analysts would continue to examine each sample that far down the queue, especially since in some
examined to successfully locate the target speaker half the time. It can be found from the value of ρ for which the cumulative density function h(ρ) = 0.5, where
(11)
Truncated-queue mean target speaker position
A truncated queue of length N is simply the top-N members of a queue, which may or may not contain the target speaker. Let L q denote the length of the truncated queue which will, with probability q, contain the target speaker. Mathematically,
If the experts using the surveillance system examine only the top L q entries, then the probability of missing the target speaker entirely is p(m) = 1 − q. Note that thatρ = L 0.5 . The mean target speaker position for those truncated queues which do contain the target speaker is given bȳ
ρ q is the average number of false alarms that must be scanned before hitting the target speaker, considering only the truncated queues of length L q which contain the target speaker. Since this occurs with probability q, it follows that with probability p(m) = 1 − q we must scan L q false alarms and then fail to detect the target speaker. The number of false alarms scanned per target speaker detected when operating in prioritisation mode is then
in comparison to the number of false alarms per target speaker detected in verification mode, which is
It is apparent from the above equations that the term qρ q + (1 − q)L q represents the probability that a non-target speaker will result in a false alarm. This allows us to directly compare the performance of a system operating in prioritization mode with the performance of the same system operating in verification mode across a range of values for p(m). For verification mode, p(m) is determined by the system operating point. For prioritization mode, p(m) is determined by the truncated queue length L q . It is convenient to plot the results on a graph with the same format as the standard DET-plot, and graph false alarms per target speaker detection against the probability of missing the target speaker. However, it is important to remember that the results are not directly comparable with other DETplots as it is relevant to the prioritization performance only, which incorporates a number of additional mechanisms and assumptions.
Modelling example
Let us now re-examine the system of 3.2 with the additional assumptions listed in section 5. First, we decide what values of µ t and σ t to use. Real system implementers, of course, are not able to simply choose these parameters, but in this case we are interested in seeing what effect they have on the performance of the system. Obviously we cannot choose purely arbitrary values for both µ t and σ t -we must choose such that the operating point (p(m), p(f )) lies on the DET curve of the system. First we note that the threshold t must be fixed, since we know that p(f ) = 0.01 and the false score has a standard normal distributon. Tables of Z-values for standard normal distributions allow us to find that t = 2.33. Since the true speaker scores are also normally distributed, we are able to select interesting values of σ t and find the corresponding µ t score as
using the value of z for which p(x > z|X ∼ N (0, 1)) = 1 − p(m).
We have chosen three distributions somewhat arbitrarily in order to examine the effect on performance. The choice of σ t was made to ensure a range of different DET curves. The resulting values of µ appear in Table 1 . The DET curves of all three systems are shown in Figure 2 . It can be seen that all systems intersect at the point (p(f ), p(m)) = (0.01, 0.001). Thus, despite their quite different characteristics, all three systems would exhibit the same performance when used in verification mode at that operating point. The mean and median target speaker ranks are given in Table 1 . 
Using our original example of N = 10
11 , and using the figure for mean target speaker position, we find that the first system gives 196,400,000 false alarms per target, the second system gives 6,500,000 false alarms per target, and the third system gives 24,600,000 false alarms per target on average. Our claim is not that these figures represent a useful surveillance system; rather, it is that these figures represent an improvement of approximately 5 times, 150 times and 40 times respectively over the performance of a system operating in verification mode which makes it clear that surveillance systems are more usefully operated in prioritization mode rather than verification mode.
The median values of these systems are even more interesting. The values ofρ n listed in Table 1 show that if the systems are to be successful half the time, an analyst need look no further than 16 entries on the queue for system T 1 , and only the top entry for systems T 2 and T 3 . These figures were produced by Monte Carlo simulations on a queue of 10,000 entries, repeated 100,000 times each, so it is likely that the 'top of the queue' figures for systems T 2 and T 3 would be degraded slightly by simulating using a longer queue. Unfortunately, attempts to calculate mean and median directly from the distribution through numerical integration proved difficult due to the extremely skewed distributions. 
Experimental comparison
Data and system description
Experimental demonstration of the queuing approach discussed in this paper was performed on the development data for the NIST Speaker Recognition Evaluation task from 2005. There were 2751 true speaker trials and 28492 false trials. The speaker recognition system was an acoustic GMM-based system. This system has the DET curve as displayed in Figure 3 . The outer curve represents the verification performance of the system. The inner curve represents the prioritization performance of the system.
The data was standardized so that µ f = 0, σ f = 1. This caused the true speaker score distribution to be nearly gaussian with µ t = 5.82, σ t = 2.92.
Surveillance performance
2438 of the 2751 true speaker samples were ranked at the top of the queue, andρ = 0.0255 andρ = 0.00024. A plot of the prioritization performance is given in Figure 3 . It can be seen that the curves representing prioritization bends downward to meet the point (ρ, 0) as expected from the definition ofρ. This results in the prioritization system having dramatically better false alarm rates for the same miss rates when compared to a verification system. A plot of results simulated from pure gaussian data with the same first order statistics as the experimental scores is shown in Figure 3 . As expected, the simulation displays the same behaviour as the experimental data, but there is a significant performance difference caused by the deviation from the experimental data from gaussianity. This indicates that assessing performance accurately will require either large-scale tests or more accurate modelling of score distributions.
Discussion
It is important to remember that the significant performance improvements as measured byρ andρ do not represent a free performance enhancement. They are predicated on a method of use whereby results are passed to human experts in priority order for subsequent assessment and action. However, the need for such experts in most surveillance systems means that the analysis applies in many cases. In addition, the methods presented only apply to a system which can operate on stored data and is able to defer decision making until all data is available. For example, a system may gather data for 24 hours then present the results to the experts in the form of a queue. A system which is required to present item-by-item decisions will not be able to operate in prioritization mode.
It is possible, indeed likely, that experts will not be able to correctly identify the target speaker with absolute accuracy. This may be taken into account in the above analysis quite simply. If an expert misses the target speaker with probability p e (m) = x, then the effective probability of a truncated queue of length L q missing the target speaker is p(m) = x(1 − q), and the rest follows.
Other researchers have written about a number of techniques used to improve the performance of speaker recognition systems. We note that it is possible that some techniques may change the behaviour of surveillance systems in a similar manner to the change in performance seen between T 1 , T 2 and T 3 in section 7, while not having as significant an impact on the performance of verification systems. The effects of techniques such as those discussed below, and new techniques trialled in the future, should be examined for their effect on queue prioritization performance as described in this paper.
It was noted in [10] that the use of Bayes factor scoring tended to cause a counter-clockwise rotation of the DET curve, which would normally be consistent with an decrease in the σ-ratio. However, it was noted that direct measurement of the variance of the actual true-speaker and falsespeaker score distributions revealed that the σ-ratio had increased. The counter-clockwise rotation of the DET curve was interpreted as an effect of the increased Gaussianity (as revealed by negentropy statistics) of the score distributions. Whether Bayes factor scoring is indeed beneficial to surveillance applications is unknown and should be determined by further experiment.
It has been shown that the use of T-norm with large cohort sizes [2] , and feature mapping with T-norm [7] , also causes a noticeable counter-clockwise rotation of the DET curve. Until further analysis of the cause of this rotation is available, it is unknown whether these techniques are beneficial to surveillance filtering performance.
Conclusions
Most surveillance systems need some level of human involvement in the outcomes. As such it may not be necessary to force the automated components of the system to make hard accept/reject decisions. By focussing instead on prioritization of samples, automated systems are able to achieve significant improvements in performance, as measured by false alarms per target detection for truncated queues. A model for the performance of systems having Gaussian output score distributions for target speakers and false speakers was given. This model was shown to have good correspondence to the performance of a real speaker recognition system.
